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LANDMARKS JUDGEMENTS ON BHARATIYA SAKSHYA ADHINIYAM, 2023 OR INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 |
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES |
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CASE NAME |
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1. Khurshid Ahmed vs The State of Jammu and Kashmir, (2018) 7 SCC 429 |
The court established that when analyzing evidence, a hyper-technical approach should be avoided, and evidence should not be discarded due to minor inconsistencies, as the purpose is to assess the overall reliability and truthfulness of the evidence rather than find fault with trivial discrepancies. |
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2. Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2018) 6 SCC 433 |
The Latin maxim "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" means "false in one thing, false in everything". In its strict sense, it suggests that if any part of a witness's testimony is found to be false, the entire testimony should be rejected. This maxim is not applicable in India. |
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3. Abdul Razak v. State (1969) 2 SCC 234 |
The Supreme Court of India did not hold that the discovery of a fact with the help of a tracker dog is scientific evidence. The court viewed tracker dog evidence with suspicion and concluded that even if it is admissible, it does not carry much weight. |
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4. Kuna Alias Sanjaya Behera v. State Of Odisha, (2018) 1 SCC 296 |
The Supreme Court clarified that the terms "proved," "disproved," and "not proved" establish the standard of proof from a prudent person's perspective, requiring that all probabilities and improbabilities of circumstances be fully considered when assessing "proof". |
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5. Ganesh K Gulve v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 3068 |
The Supreme Court emphasized the judicial duty to appreciate evidence to separate the true facts from falsehoods, a process likened to separating grain from chaff. This involves a comprehensive and careful review to ascertain the genuine substance of the evidence presented, taking into account factors like the witnesses' understanding, the environment of the crime, and inconsistencies in narration to arrive at a correct and logical conclusion. |
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6. R.Jayapal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2019) 8 SCC 342 |
The Supreme Court of India held that courts have a duty to "separate the grain from the chaff," meaning they must try to find the truth within the evidence. If the false parts (chaff) and true parts (grain) of the evidence can be distinguished, the court can convict the accused based on the reliable evidence. |
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7. Rajesh Dhiman v. State of H.P., (2020) 10 SCC 740 |
The Supreme Court of India clarified that "reasonable doubt" does not mean absolute certainty; rather, it means that the evidence must be so strong that it removes all reasonable doubts from the mind of a ordinary person, before a court can legally declare an accused person guilty. |
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8. Parminder Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2020) 8 SCC 811 |
The Supreme Court of India reinforced the principle that it is the prosecution's duty to present the "best evidence" in its possession. The Court held that the failure to do so, especially when such evidence is available, should lead to an adverse inference against the prosecution. |
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9. Sunil v. State of M.P., (2017) 4 SCC 393 |
The Supreme Court held that a conviction is still possible even if DNA tests were not conducted on samples from the accused or if a DNA profiling report was not proven in court, provided there is sufficient other evidence to support the prosecution's case. |
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10. Kathi David Raju v. State of A.P., (2019) 7 SCC 769 |
The Supreme Court held that a direction for a DNA test to identify a person must be based on the police's satisfaction after a substantial investigation, rather than being used as a fishing inquiry. The police cannot request a DNA test without sufficient material gathered from a thorough investigation; otherwise, ordering such a test would be an unsustainable step. |
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RELEVANT FACTS |
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11. Basanti v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1987J3SSC227 |
The Supreme Court held that the accused's false and immediate statement about the deceased's absence was admissible as a relevant fact under the doctrine of res gestae. |
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12. R. v. Foster (1834)6 C&P 325 |
The court allowed a witness to testify about what a deceased accident victim told him immediately after being run over. Although the witness only saw the speeding vehicle and not the accident itself, the victim's statement was admitted as evidence under the doctrine of res gestae. |
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13. G. Vijay Vardhan Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 2971 |
The Supreme Court of India clarified that for a statement to be considered part of the res gestae (and thus admissible as an exception to the rule against hearsay), it must be spontaneous and contemporaneous with the fact or transaction in question, and not made after a reflection period. |
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14. Gentela Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1996) 6 SCC 241 |
The Supreme Court affirmed that the principle of res gestae, under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, allows hearsay statements to be admitted when they are made with spontaneity and immediacy, forming part of the same transaction as the event in question. |
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15. Sukhar v. State ofU.P., (1999) 9 SCC 507 |
The Supreme Court affirmed that Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act makes hearsay evidence admissible if it is part of the same transaction (res gestae) and almost contemporaneous with the fact in issue, with no interval allowing for fabrication. |
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16. Harendra Rai V. State of Bihar, 2023 |
The Supreme Court noted that the accused's subsequent conduct—attempting to suppress evidence, influencing witnesses, and using the court as a tool—indicated a guilty mind and strongly suggested guilt for the incident. The Court found the conduct to be a major circumstance pointing to the accused's guilt, contrasting it with an innocent person's behavior and highlighting the blatant misuse of the trial process by a powerful individual. |
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17. Ram Lochan v. State of West Bengal AIR 1963 SC 1074 |
The Supreme Court of India held that a superimposed photograph, created by placing an image of the deceased's face over a human skeleton, was admissible in evidence under Section 9 of the Indian Evidence Act to prove the identity of the skeleton. |
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18. Jadunath Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1971 SC 363 |
The Supreme Court held that a Test Identification Parade (TIP) is not compulsory in every case and is not fatal to the prosecution's case if the accused persons were previously known to the witnesses. |
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19. Abdul WaheedKhan v. State of A.P., (2002) 7 SCC 175 |
The Supreme Court stated that it is desirable for identification parades to be held soon after an accused's arrest to ensure the witness's memory is fresh, but this is not a mandatory requirement. |
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20. Malkhan Singh v. State of M.P., (2003) 5 SCC 746 |
The Supreme Court held that a test identification (TI) parade is not substantive evidence but rather a rule of prudence to confirm the witness's identification of a stranger in court. |
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21. Rajesh v. State of Haryana, (2020) SCC Online SC 900 |
The Supreme Court summarized principles regarding Test Identification Parades (TIPs), emphasizing that a TIP's purpose is to corroborate a witness's identification of the accused and test their memory without tutoring. The court stated that guilt cannot be based solely on an accused's refusal to participate in a TIP, that TIPs are investigative tools without a legal right for the accused to demand one, and that failure to hold a TIP does not make identification evidence inadmissible but does impact its weight. |
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22. Chunthuram v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2020) 10 SCC 733 |
The Supreme Court of India held that Test Identification (TI) evidence is not substantive evidence but can only corroborate a witness's court statement. |
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23. Sukhpal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2019) 15 SCC 622 |
The Supreme Court of India held that the prosecution's inability to establish a motive is not necessarily fatal to its case if it is based on circumstantial evidence. |
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24. Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of UJL (1981) 2 SCC 166 |
The Supreme Court defined a plea of alibi as requiring proof of the physical impossibility of the accused's presence at the crime scene, because they were located elsewhere at the time of the offence. |
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25. Kamal Prasad and Others v. State of M.P. (2023) |
The Supreme Court of India upheld that a plea of alibi is not a general exception under the Indian Penal Code, but rather a rule of evidence under Section 11 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The court clarified several key principles regarding the burden of proof and evidentiary standards for an alibi defence. |
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26. Kehar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1980 SC 1883 |
The Supreme Court of India did establish that only a prima facie (at first sight) case of criminal conspiracy needs to be made out to invoke Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. |
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27. Badri Rai v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 953 |
The consideration and statements made by one conspirator against another during the course of the conspiracy comes within the scope of Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. |
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28. Sardul Singh v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 747 |
The Supreme Court explained that the principle of agency forms the basis of Section 10 of the Evidence Act, which allows evidence of acts and statements by one conspirator to be used against others. |
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29. Mirza Akbar v. King Emperor, AIR 1940 PC 176 |
The Privy Council clarified that Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act only makes statements and actions relevant against co-conspirators if they were made while the conspiracy was in operation and in furtherance of the common intention, not afterward. |
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30. C.B.I. v. V.C. Shukla, AIR 1998 SC 1406 |
The Supreme Court held that in a conspiracy, any act committed by one conspirator can be attributed to all other conspirators based on the principles of agency. |
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31. Sardul Singh v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 747 |
The principle underlining the reception of evidence of the statements, acts and writings of one co-conspirator as against the other is on the theory of agency. |
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32. R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 157 |
The Supreme Court held that a tape-recorded conversation is admissible as evidence if it is relevant to the matters in issue, the voice is identified, and its accuracy is proven by eliminating any possibility of the tape being tampered with or erased. |
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RELEVANCY & ADMISSIBILITY |
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33. Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1994)4SSC517 |
The Supreme Court clarified that "relevancy" and "admissibility" are distinct legal concepts, not interchangeable. Relevancy concerns the logical connection between a fact and the facts in issue, while admissibility deals with whether a relevant fact is legally permitted to be presented in court, according to the rules of evidence |
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34. Sahoo v. State of U.P, AIR 1966 SC 40 |
The Supreme Court of India upheld the conviction of the appellant, clarifying the distinction between the legal admissibility of a confession and the weight or reliability a court should attribute to it. The Court established a "double test" to evaluate confessional statements, requiring the court to be satisfied on two fronts before basing a conviction on a confession. |
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35. Dhanpat v. Sheo Ram, (2020) 16 SCC 209 |
The Supreme Court of India reiterated that when an objection is raised during the evidence-taking stage regarding the admissibility of any material, the trial court should note the objection and decide it at the final judgment stage. |
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ADMISSION AND CONFESSION |
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36. Bharat Singh v. Bhagirathi, AIR 1966 SC 405 |
The Supreme Court held that admission is substantive evidence of the fact admitted and admission duly proved are admissible irrespective of whether the party making them appears as a witness or not. |
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37. Hanumant Narain v. State of M.P., 1975 AIR 1083 SC |
An admission must be accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole, is a fundamental principle governing the evaluation of statements made by an accused person. This principle prevents the prosecution from using only the incriminating parts of a statement while ignoring the self-exculpatory portions. |
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38. CBI v. V.C. Shukla, (1998) 3 SCC 410 |
The Supreme Court clarified that an admission made by an individual is generally not admissible as evidence against other accused persons unless it meets the definition of a confession of a co-accused, which can then be used against others under Section 10 or Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act. |
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39. Biswanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad, AIR 1974 SC 117 |
The Indian Supreme Court case of established a fundamental distinction in the law of evidence between an admission made by a party and a previous statement made by a witness. The core difference is in their evidentiary value: an admission by a party is considered "substantive evidence," whereas a witness's prior inconsistent statement is used only to "discredit" their credibility. |
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40. Pakla Narayan Swami v. Emperor AIR 1939 PC 47 |
Lord Atkin defined a confession as a statement that "must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence". This definition was subsequently approved by the Indian Supreme Court in the case of Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab. |
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41. Abdul Rashid v. State of Bihar, AIR 2001 SC 2422 |
The Supreme Court of India held that a confession made to a Superintendent of Excise under the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act was inadmissible because the officer, by virtue of the extensive powers conferred by the Act, was deemed a "police officer" for the purposes of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. |
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42. Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 119 |
The Supreme Court of India clarified that a confession made to a police officer is inadmissible as evidence under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, even if the entire statement isn't admitted. |
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43. Mohd. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1976 SC 483 |
The Supreme Court clarified that for the discovery of evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, it must be proven the object was discovered from a place of hiding, as an object in an open place makes it difficult to link its discovery to the accused's information. The Court affirmed that Section 27 acts as an exception to the general provisions of Sections 24 to 26 of the Evidence Act. |
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44. Manoj Kumar Soni v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 2023 |
The State of Madhya Pradesh, the court emphasized that while disclosure statements can be a contributing factor in solving a case, they are not a strong enough piece of evidence to secure a conviction on their own. |
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45. Nishikant Jha v. State of Bihar, AIR 1952 SC 1033 |
The Supreme Court held that the court may rely on the inculpatory part of a confession while rejecting the exculpatory part, but only if there is sufficient independent evidence proving the exculpatory part to be false. |
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46. Pyare Lal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1094 |
The Supreme Court established that a retracted confession can be the basis for a conviction if the court is satisfied it was truthful and voluntary. |
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47. State of Punjab v. Gurdeep Singh, (1999) 7 SCC 714 |
The Supreme Court of India upheld the principle that an extra-judicial confession is admissible evidence. However, the court stressed that it cannot be the sole basis for a conviction unless it is reliable and corroborated by other independent and credible evidence. |
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48. State of Karnataka v. P. Ravi Kumar, (2018) 9 SCC 614 |
The Supreme Court of India reiterated the well-established legal principle that an extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. A conviction cannot be based solely on such a confession unless it is supported and corroborated by other substantive evidence |
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49. Ashish Jain v. Makrand Singh, (2019) 3 SCC 770 |
The Supreme Court held that an involuntary confessional statement, even if it leads to the discovery of incriminating material, carries no evidentiary value if it was made under undue pressure or compulsion from an investigating officer. |
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50. State (N.C. T of Delhi) v. Navjot Sindhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600 |
Confessions are considered highly reliable because no rational person would make an admission against himself unless prompted by his conscience to tell the truth. |
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51. Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 354 |
The Supreme Court of India established the critical principle that a confession must either be accepted in its entirety or rejected completely. A court cannot selectively rely on the inculpatory (guilt-admitting) parts of a statement while disregarding the exculpatory (self-clearing) parts. |
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52. Mohd. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1976 SC 483 |
The Supreme Court clarified that for Section 27 of the Evidence Act to apply, there must be a discovery of a fact, the fact must be deposed to, the accused must be in police custody when the information is received, and only the portion of the information that distinctly leads to the discovered fact is admissible. |
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53. Bal Kishan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 379 |
The Supreme Court held that the primary test to determine if an officer under a Special Act is a "police officer" for the purpose of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act is whether they possess all the powers of an officer in charge of a police station, including the power to investigate and initiate prosecution by submitting a charge-sheet under Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code. |
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54. Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 45 |
The Supreme Court held that the crucial characteristic of a police officer under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act is the power to investigate AND file a charge-sheet (report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, CrPC). |
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55. Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 |
The Privy Council clarified that a "fact discovered" under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act includes the place from which an object is found and the accused's knowledge of its existence and location. |
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56. Kehar Singh v. State, AIR 1988 SC 1883 |
The court ruled on the admissibility of confessions recorded by a Magistrate, clarifying that such confessions must strictly follow the procedure in Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). If the recording process contains irregularities, the confession may still be admissible if the defects are minor and can be cured under Section 463 CrPC. |
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57. Kushal Toppo v. State of Jharkhand, (2019) 13 SCC 676 |
The Indian Supreme Court established the principle that an extra-judicial confession, meaning a confession made outside of a court, is considered a weak piece of evidence and should not be relied upon solely for conviction unless corroborated by other independent evidence; further, such a confession cannot be used as substantive evidence against a co-accused. |
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58. Devi Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 19 SCC 447
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The Supreme Court noted that an extra-judicial confession is inherently weak evidence and a conviction should not be based solely on it. The court will only rely on such a confession if it is supported by a chain of cogent circumstances or other corroborating evidence. |
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59. Manoharan v. State, (2020) 5 SCC 782 |
The Supreme Court of India upheld the long-established legal principle that while a retracted judicial confession is admissible, courts must apply a rule of prudence by seeking material corroboration before basing a conviction solely upon it. |
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60. Somasundaram v. State, (2020) 7 SCC 722 |
The Supreme Court of India reinforced the long-established legal principle concerning the admissibility of disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Court reiterated that the "fact discovered" includes not only the physical object recovered but also the accused person's knowledge of its existence and location. |
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DYING DECLARATION |
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61. Uka Ram v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2001 SC 1814 |
The Supreme Court of India upheld the legal principle that a dying declaration is considered credible evidence based on the maxim Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentiri ("a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth"). However, in this specific case, the court ruled that the dying declaration of the deceased wife, Parveena, was not reliable due to substantial doubts about her mental competence at the time of the statement. |
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62. Pakla Narayan Swami v. Emperor AIR 1939 PC 47 |
The Privy Council held that the deceased's statement to his wife about going to collect money from the accused was admissible as a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, because it described a circumstance directly leading to his death, even if it was a statement of future intention. |
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63. Kaushal Rao v. State of Bombay (1958) SCR 552 |
The Supreme Court held that a dying declaration can be the sole basis for a conviction if it is found to be truthful and voluntary, establishing that there is no legal requirement for corroboration unless suspicion arises about the statement's reliability. |
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64. Queen Empress v. Abdullah (1885) 7 A11 385 FB |
The Allahabad High Court held that a dying declaration could be made through signs and gestures, not just words. |
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65. Sanjay v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC148 |
If there are apparent discrepancies in two dying declarations, it would be unsafe to convict the accused. The Court found that the inconsistencies between the dying declarations made by the victim in this case rendered it unsafe to uphold the conviction for abetting suicide and directed that the accused be released. |
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66. Kashmira Devi v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 11 SCC 343 |
The Supreme Court held that when there are multiple dying declarations in a case, each one must be evaluated independently and on its own merits, meaning that one declaration cannot be rejected solely because it contradicts the content of another declaration. |
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67. Purshottam Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 11 SCC 489 |
The Supreme Court of India reaffirmed the established legal principle that a dying declaration is not invalidated simply because it was not recorded by a magistrate or police officer. The court emphasized that the crucial factors are the reliability and voluntary nature of the statement, rather than the identity of the person who recorded it. |
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EXPERT EVIDENCE |
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68. Gopala Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 2184 |
The Supreme Court held that expert evidence is considered weak and not conclusive proof, emphasizing that courts should not rely solely on expert opinions but must seek independent and reliable corroboration to form a sound judgment. |
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69. Musheer Khan v. State of M.P., AIR 2010 SC 762 |
The Supreme Court held that a fingerprint expert's testimony is not substantive evidence but can be used to corroborate other, stronger forms of evidence already on record. This means the fingerprint evidence cannot stand alone to prove a fact but must be supported by other established facts to be considered reliable. |
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70. M. Siddiq v. Suresh Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1 |
This case is also known as the Ayodhya case. The Supreme Court of India examined the weight to be given to expert evidence based on the nature of the science it is drawn from. The court's observations distinguished between scientific fields with a high degree of verifiability and objective analysis and those that are less certain. |
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71. State of Uttarakhand v. Darshan Singh, (2020) 12 SCC 605 |
The Supreme Court affirmed the principle that a significant and irreconcilable inconsistency between the testimonies of eyewitnesses and the medical or ballistic evidence constitutes a fundamental defect in the prosecution's case. |
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DOCUMENTARY & ORAL EVIDENCE |
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72. Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani, (2003) 6 SCC 595 |
Section 91 and 92 are based on recognition of the jural act of integration in case of written instruments and applies even on a third party seeking to establish a contract. |
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73. R, Janakiraman v. State, (2006) 1 SCC 697 |
The Supreme Court held that Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act only bars oral evidence intended to contradict, vary, add to, or subtract from the terms of a written instrument between the parties. |
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74. Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kishanrao Gorantyal And Ors. (2020) 7 SCC 1 |
The Supreme Court of India clarified and reaffirmed the mandatory nature of the certificate required under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, for the admissibility of electronic records. |
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75. Dhanpat v. Sheo Ram, (2020) 16 SCC 209 |
The Supreme Court affirmed that under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a document like a will, which requires attestation by law, cannot be used as evidence until at least one of the attesting witnesses is examined to prove the execution of the document. |
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PRESUMPTION & BURDEN OF PROOF |
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76. NandLal Wasudeo Badwaick v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik, (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 65 |
The Supreme Court of India ruled that while Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act establishes a conclusive presumption of paternity for children born during a marriage, a DNA test, due to its scientific accuracy, can be used to rebut this presumption. |
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77. Sanjay Dutt v. State, (1994) 5 SCC 410 |
The Supreme Court of India held that when a statutory provision reverses the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof on the accused is not as heavy as the prosecution's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. |
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78. P. Narsimha Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2001 SC 318 |
Section 114 of Evidence Act gives absolute discretion to the court to presume the existence of certain facts in manners specified therein. While inferring existence of a fact the court is required to apply a process of intelligent reasoning about what a prudent man would do under similar circumstances. |
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79. Shailendra Rajdev Pasvan v. State of Gujarat, (2020) 14 SCC 750 |
Last seen evidence may be relied upon when the lapse of time between the point when the accused and deceased were seen together and when the deceased was dead ought to be so minimal so as to exclude the possibility of any intervening event involving the death at the hands of some other person. |
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80. M. Siddiq v. Suresh Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1 |
The Supreme Court of India cited the principle that "title follows possession" to clarify Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act, which governs the burden of proof in ownership disputes. |
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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS |
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81. Ram Bharose v. State of U.P,9 AIR 1954 SC 704 |
The Supreme Court of India held that Section 122 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, does not protect a spouse's acts or conduct from being revealed in testimony, only their verbal or written communications. |
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82. Queen Empress v. Donoghue ILR (1899) 22Mad.l |
This was a significant decision under Section 122 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, regarding the admissibility of spousal communications. The court held that a communication between spouses, even a confidential one, is admissible if it is retrieved by a third party, such as the police, and not disclosed in court by one of the spouses. |
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83. M.C. Verghese v. TJ Ponnan AIR 1970 SC 1876 |
The Supreme Court held that the bar under Section 122 of the Indian Evidence Act, which protects communications during marriage, applies to the receiving spouse and not to third persons. The protection continues even after the dissolution of the marriage. |
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84. State of UP v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 865 |
The Supreme Court of India examined Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act, which protects unpublished official records relating to "affairs of State". The court reinterpreted the scope of this provision, holding that executive privilege is not absolute and must be balanced against the public interest in a transparent and just legal process. |
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WITNESSES |
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85. Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. AIR 2003 SC 1088 |
The Court held that the testimony of a child witness must be evaluated with great caution. The ruling emphasized that children are susceptible to tutoring, and therefore, courts should seek corroboration from other reliable evidence before basing a conviction solely on their testimony. |
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86. Dagdu V. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 SC 1579 |
The Supreme Court of India held that there is no conflict between Section 133 and Illustration (b) of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. While Section 133 provides a rule of law regarding accomplice testimony, Illustration (b) to Section 114 sets out a rule of prudence for the court to follow. |
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87. Rabinder Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa, AIR 1977 SC 170 |
The Supreme Court of India held that the testimony of an accomplice is admissible and does not need to be rejected in its entirety. |
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88. R. v. Baskerville (1916)2K.B. 658 |
The court established that the corroboration of an accomplice's testimony does not require independent confirmation of every detail; instead, corroboration is sufficient if it supports the material circumstances of the case or the accused's connection to the crime, as confirmed by circumstantial evidence. |
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89. Sukhwant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 1601 |
The Supreme Court of India held that a witness must first be examined-in-chief before they can be cross-examined, as per the Indian Evidence Act. |
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90. Ganapathi v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2018) 5 SCC 549 |
The Supreme Court clarified that an "interested witness" is one who derives a personal benefit or has a motive, such as prior enmity or to see the accused punished, from the outcome of a litigation, rather than simply being a relative of the victim. |
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91. Leela Srinivasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2004 SC 1720 |
The Supreme Court of India held that the evidence of a witness declared hostile does not have to be automatically rejected. The court may rely on the credible and trustworthy portions of a hostile witness's testimony, especially if those parts are corroborated by other evidence on record. |
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92. Ravasaheb @ Ravasahebgouda Etc. v. State of Karnataka, 2023 |
The Supreme Court held that the corroborated parts of a hostile witness's testimony are admissible and can form the basis for conviction, as mere deviations from an FIR don't render the entire testimony unreliable. |
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93. Ramchander v. State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 1036 |
The Supreme Court of India discussed the broad powers of a judge under Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, but also placed vital limitations on how these powers must be exercised. |
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94. Somasundaram v. State, (2020) 7 SCC 722 |
The Supreme Court of India examined the legal principle regarding the testimony of an accomplice. The court held that the combined effect of Section 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is that while a conviction is not illegal if based solely on uncorroborated accomplice testimony, it is unsafe and constitutes a "rule of prudence" to do so. |
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95. Pradeep vs State of Haryana (2023) |
The Supreme Court of India emphasized that while the testimony of a child witness is not automatically unreliable, it must be evaluated with a high degree of caution. The court reiterated that corroboration is a rule of prudence, not a strict requirement for conviction, but that the possibility of a child being tutored must be carefully considered. |